Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Bayesianism: perceives probability as the degree of a belief. See also subjective probability, objective probability, chance, likelihood._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Bas van Fraassen on Bayesianism - Dictionary of Arguments
I 22 Bayes/Bayesian/Fraassen: typical: start from a "start pbrlty : a) P (H)> P (H ) - H has higher prblty as H - tradition only goes from b): b) P (EIH)> P (EI H ). H delivers higher pbrlty for e as H. This assumes that certain pbrlty be delivered - that s not where H is a mere negation of H! Then no particular pbrlty of H. Solution/Bayes: everyone has a subjective pbrlty (belief degrees). >Probability, >Theories, >Hypotheses._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Fr I B. van Fraassen The Scientific Image Oxford 1980 |
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> Counter arguments against Fraassen
> Counter arguments in relation to Bayesianism
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27